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This article seeks to elaborate the step of epistemological affirmation that exists within 
every movement of learning. My epistemological method is rooted in philosophical 
hermeneutics in contrast to empirical or rationalist traditions. I argue that any 
movement of learning is based upon an entry into a hermeneutical circle: one is thrown 
into, or leaps into an interpretation which in some sense has to be temporarily affirmed 
or adopted in order to be either absorbed and integrated, or overcome and rejected. I 
illustrate this process through a retrieval of the concept of submission in pedagogy, 
particularly with reference to submission in Oriental traditions, as well as pre-modern 
Christian thought. These other traditions are introduced to contrast with the modern 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this article is primarily epistemological. My principal concern is to 
elaborate the step of epistemological affirmation that exists within every movement of 
learning. I will argue that one has to engage in a kind of pre-critical µSULPDU\DIILUPDWLRQ¶
in order to undertake the kind of learning necessary for a critical engagement with what 
one learns. That this is in contrast to the empirical tradition of the tabula rasa need not 
suggest an idealist/rationalist approach. Rather my approach is best described as 
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hermeneutical. I propose that any movement of learning is based upon an entry into a 
hermeneutical circle:i one is thrown into, or leaps into an interpretation which in some 
sense has to be temporarily affirmed or adopted in order to be either absorbed and 
integrated, or overcome and rejected. Speaking of the level at which we always already 
begin within an affirmed pre-understanding or interpretation, the philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur describes hermeneutics as proceeding ³from a prior understanding of the very 
WKLQJWKDWLWWULHVWRXQGHUVWDQGE\LQWHUSUHWLQJLW´ (1967, 352). I intend to illustrate this 
principle through a retrieval of the concept of submission in pedagogy, particularly with 
reference to submission in Oriental traditions, as well as pre-modern Christian thought. 
These other traditions are introduced to contrast with the modern liberal Western 
perspective in which the role of submission has been almost entirely lost.  
Philosophical context 
Within the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, the hermeneutical circle has been 
employed to describe the interaction between the structure of our pre-understandings 
and our perception of things: our pre-understandings give rise to, or constitute our 
perceptions, while themselves undergoing reinterpretation following those 
perceptions.ii Prior to this development within modern philosophy, hermeneutics arose 
to facilitate the complex process of Scriptural interpretation. In this article I will employ 
the insights of philosophical hermeneutics towards an interpretation of the structure of 
pedagogy. The significance of these insights for education are broad, though I would 
suggest at the outset that a proper understanding of affirmation within education can 
help us to resist the worst excesses of the efforts to secularize the modern curriculum. 
This is because no curriculum, no educational system, can be entirely free of 
commitment. A secular curriculum, as much as any, affirms a range of ideas for which 
there can be no absolute justification; it is a matter of judgement as to where one locates 
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the step of primary affirmation. The desire of secular liberalism to separate church and 
state clearly involves particular commitments, which are far from uncontested, about 
the proper role and scope of the state. The notion that no educational system is without 
its pre-understandings is important not only to resist the caustic atheism and somewhat 
more tempered secularism that characterize recent cultural discourse,iii but also to help 
us in assessing the appropriate contribution that any rooted tradition can make to 
education, and where that contribution should be seen as excessive or unfounded. To 
that end, I address in particular those seeking to understand the relations between our 
embedded cultural traditions (whether that is framed in explicitly Christian, or more 
broadly liberal terms) and our responsibilities to educate informed, thoughtful, engaged 
and free citizens. 
Returning to the structure of philosophical hermeneutics, I suggest that the 
process of interpretation/understanding that always precedes critical engagement, what 
Ricoeur calls a first naïveté (1967, 19), requires a form of speculative engagement that 
SODFHVRQHLQDUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHOHDUQLQJWKDWLVµLQYROYHG¶iv For early Ricoeur, it 
is in the field of religious studies that the movement from a pre-critical first naïveté to 
a post-critical second naïveté is particularly applicable, though this structure applies 
just as well to the process of understanding and pedagogy more generally, and so is 
worthy of elaboration. In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur describes the first naïveté as 
the attitude in which religious truths are taken at simple face value. Ricoeur argues that 
the rational forces of modernity have made this simple relation to religious truth 
generally untenable, leading us to pass through a phase of critical distance, or 
distanciation. But rather than simply living in a post-critical atheism, Ricoeur argues 
that it is possible to move beyond this critical stage towards a post-critical second 
naïveté: "Beyond the desert of criticism, we wish to be called again" (1967, 349). The 
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details of how Ricoeur achieves this post-critical understanding are complex (1967, 
1977). But the general structure ± the 3-stage movement of affirmation, critique and re-
engagement ± can provide a model for pedagogy more generally. In his later writings, 
Ricoeur (1984) reconfigures the three stage interpretive structure through his work on 
WKHXQLW\RIWLPHDQGQDUUDWLYHLQKLV³WKUHHIROGPLPHVLV´:DOODFH. Here Ricoeur 
employs the language of prefiguration (mimesis 1), configuration (mimesis 2), and 
refiguration (mimesis 3) from Time and Narrative (1984), which encourages a clear 
identification of RQH¶V FRPPLWPHQW DV WKH SUHILJXUHG µSUH-QDUUDWLYH¶ LQ ZKLFK any 
understanding (as narrative) becomes possible. While this later expression is many 
ways a broader µOLWHUDU\¶ retelling of 5LFRHXU¶V earlier philosophical hermeneutics, I am 
keen to recall the more explicitly theological moment captured in the earlier work of 
The Symbolism of Evil. 
More directly addressing the step of primary affirmation, Ricoeur describes the 
VWUXFWXUHRIWKHKHUPHQHXWLFDOFLUFOHLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPV³7KHFLUFOHFDQEHVWDWHG
EOXQWO\ µ:H PXVW XQGHUVWDQG LQ RUGHU WR EHOLHYH EXW ZH PXVW EHOLHYH LQ RUGHU WR
understDQG¶7KHFLUFOHLVQRWDYLFLRXVFLUFOHVWLOOOHVVDPRUWDORQHLWLVDOLYLQJDQG
VWLPXODWLQJ FLUFOH´ (1967, 351). Unsurprisingly for Ricoeur, this statement clearly 
draws upon the theological idea of faith seeking understanding in which a step, or leap 
of faith is part of the process of engagement with something other (God).v As the 
philosopher of religion Kierkegaard rightly saw, the leap of faith cannot be organized 
or made rational (1980). It must involve the total abandonment of what one understands 
to be the rules of the game such that it can be an authentic response to an impossible 
question, or an infinite theological demand. Any response to a theological call is, in this 
sense, a wager. vi  We respond to a call made only in the hope, never the secure 
knowledge, that what we hear is not simply the product of our own pre-understanding.  
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Nor is the pursuit of scientific knowledge able to avoid the leap of affirmation 
here defined. Philosophers of science like Michael Polanyi (1958) and Paul Feyerabend 
(1978) have amply demonstrated the fallacy of the pursuit of objective scientific 
knowledge. But this does not undermine the power of science; rather it shows the 
necessary structure in which scientific understanding develops. John Polkinghorne is 
explicit in his concern to relDWHWKHVFLHQWLVW¶VDFWRIFRPPLWPHQWWRDWOHDVWVRPHEDVLF
consistency as a presupposition of any scientific research, with an apprehension of 
GLYLQHRUGHULQWKHFRVPRV³The scientist commits himself to belief in the rationality 
of the world in order tRGLVFRYHUZKDWIRUPWKDWUDWLRQDOLW\WDNHV´(1991, 6). But the 
implication of circularity is not intended to crush scientific progress, but to properly 
contextuali]HLWDFRQWH[WZKLFKGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHDIILUPDWLRQRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³1R
one of serious intent can escape the necessity of an intellectual bootstrap to raise himself 
DERYHWKHHDUWKERXQGVWDWHRIXQUHIOHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH´(1991, 7). 
From a pedagogical perspective, the commitment, or leap, exists in the sense 
that in order to truly understand something beyond mere tautology, one has to enter into 
the appropriate orientation or perspective. A position is taken prior to any reflective or 
critical movement. This could be understood in terms of the traditional hermeneutical 
task of reading a text patiently or sympathetically such that its riches are given a chance 
to reveal themselves, or in terms of a more foundational epistemological problem of 
understanding in general. We might call this the course of understanding in so far as 
understanding is not simply arrived at following a direct encounter with some novel 
aspect of knowledge, but rather emerges dialectically through a 3-stage course or 
process of primary affirmation, critical reflection and, finally post-critical adoption and 
adaptation.vii In order to explore this course of understanding within pedagogy I want 
to make a comparison between what I will crudely characterize as a comparison 
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between Eastern and Western pedagogy. I acknowledge the limitations of the rather 
blunt analysis of world history in terms of the dated East/West binary (see Maxwell 
2010, 1-32), but will use this analysis as a heuristic tool to make a general point about 
the structure of pedagogy that, in the final analysis, does not depend upon the fine 
accuracy of the characterization itself. It could be said that this example itself plays the 
role of a first naïveté providing a platform for a critical engagement with the ideas I 
intend it to illustrate. And so, in the spirit of ethnographic inquiry, I present my own 
experience of learning and teaching Tai Chi in an autobiographical fashion, so that the 
structure of commitment, along with some of the consequent problems, can be clearly 
identified and elaborated. The underlying significance here is that structure of pedagogy 
in Eastern traditions is in stark contrast to the conventional view in Western philosophy 
of education and educational practice: that the learner must be educated towards 
absolute autonomy (Bridges 1997). 
Tai Chi 
When I first discovered the Chinese health art Tai Chi at the age of nineteen, I did not 
know what I was getting myself into. I thought it might be fun to do, good exercise and, 
knowing that the Master also taught martial arts, I hoped that I would learn some 
interesting combat techniques. I began with an open mind, but with a sense that there 
were hidden depths to this ancient art. As the weeks of training rolled on, I become 
more interested and engaged. The weeks became months, and the months, years, until, 
in the fullness of time I became a senior instructor running my own branches and 
training daily, sometimes for hours.  
What began as an interest in health and martial arts, became so much more. I realized 
that Tai Chi represented a way of being that engaged the human body, mind and spirit 
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on many levels. There was no way I could have understood the meaning of the art 
without spending time engaged in daily practice. And the discipline of daily practice 
was not easy, but for reasons that are not entirely clear to me, I stuck at it. There is 
something of a paradox at the heart of this process. I sought some kind of engagement 
or fulfillment that I both did and did not recognize as present in the practice. I had some 
inkling that the discipline of daily practice was worthwhile, but there was no way that 
I could fully comprehend the meaning of what I was beginning to get into.  
This article is primarily concerned with elaborating this epistemological structure as it 
arises in a number of contexts, so that a principle of pedagogy, largely ignored in 
modern Western educational philosophy, can be identified. The structure has its roots 
in the Platonic epistemological principle of anamnesis in which our ability to recognize 
something understood as true, is dependent, on some level, on its prior existence within 
the soul (Plato 1955; 1961). I have already suggested that this structure is best 
understood as hermeneutical, which, for the present purposes, could be seen as a 
reading of Platonic metaphysics. In the context of Tai Chi, this structure expressed itself 
in a sense that there was something to this art that I recognized despite the fact that I 
was unable to fully articulate the nature of the perception. 
Perhaps I was simply enamored by the force of personality that my master exuded. 
,QGHHGLWZDVLQVSLULQJWRVHHP\PDVWHU¶VDELOLW\WRPDLQWDLQDQLQVFUXWDEOHGHSWKZKLOH
also presenting a very pragmatic concern for his business as an instructor. But 
throughout my training I was also torn. My master had certain ways of talking and 
behaving which seemed redolent of a lost age, from certain formalities within class, to 
unusual expectations of commitment. I say unusual expectations because modern 
Londoners did not always adapt well to the structure and rigour that our master sought 
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to uphold. Yet it was those very expectations that stimulated and energized those who 
held out to discover the meaning of Tai Chi in suburban London.  
I recall a particular incident that, for me, captures something of the spirit of this 
commitment. It is such a minor incident that it scarcely seems worthy of discussion, 
but, oddly enough, the insignificance of the event adds, I think, to its broader meaning. 
viii (The idea of catching sight of the insignificant, emerges out of the hermeneutical 
LQVLJKWWKDWWKHVWUXFWXUHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQWKHµLQYROYHG¶HYHU\GD\H[SHULHQFHZKDW
Heidegger (1966) calls everydayness, are more illuminating than the deworlded 
knowledge elaborated out of the engaged context in terms of more grandiose theories 
of knowledge. Having been coming to classes for nearly a year, I had yet to speak 
directly to the master who primarily instructed senior students who in turn instructed 
the newer students such as myself - this hierarchy reflected the traditional approach. 
Then, for a reason that I do not recall, I was invited to speak with the master but had 
not given any thought to how I might address him. I was aware that students used the 
Cantonese/Mandarin honorific title Sifu to speak about the master, but I had not 
anticipated addressing him directly in that way. Being unsure, I nervously used his first 
name, at which point he gave me a look which demonstrably indicated the nature of the 
faux pas. My initial feeling was one of great embarrassment. This later gave way to a 
sense of confusion about the way in which Sifu allowed me to feel so dreadfully 
awkward without so much as a sign or word of relief. Reflecting on the incident that 
day, I considered that my interpretation of this event was, for me, a decision. I could 
choose to interpret the lack of sympathy with my discomfort which Sifu seemed to 
display as a failure of his part: a failure of his approach and/or character, an 
interpretation which might reinforce a general perception that Sifu was maintaining a 
hierarchy that suited his self-image. Alternatively, I could choose to see this as an 
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opportunity to look at my own relation to the world: that Sifu was enabling me to see 
just how fragile I was, just KRZRYHUO\VHQVLWLYHP\µHJR¶ZDVWRVXFKVLPSOHHYHU\GD\
interactions. In choosing the latter interpretation, my embarrassment and shame became 
instructive, powerful even, rather than disabling or diminishing. This was the first of 
many interactions that I could interpret in different ways: often either as denigration or 
instruction. In affirming the latter interpretation, I was choosing to suspend the critical 
interpretation of my master in which my difficulties could be safely externalized. I was 
submitting myself to his approach since he was my teacher. This example is offered as 
an illustration of what I call the paradigm of submission that, broadly speaking, is more 
characteristic of Eastern pedagogy and expressed itself, in my experience, through the 
formalities of training as a student with a master. 
The Affirmation in Submission 
I felt that many of the difficulties that other students had with the more traditional 
pedagogical style within Eastern arts ± the hierarchy, formality and a certain 
expectation of submission of personal will ± could be understood in just the terms 
expressed above, as the opportunity to look at the movement of the self as the issue to 
consider. The temptation within Western thought to externalize the problem by 
assuming it to EHDIDLOXUHRIWKHµSURGXFW¶± the class or the instructors, was thoroughly 
countered by a sense that most difficulties were actually the natural expression of the 
anxieties of self-identity, put under pressure both by the unfamiliar formalities, as well 
as the silence at the heart of the practice itself. The more general philosophical point 
seemed to be that submission became an opportunity to uncover the self rather than a 
negation of the self.ix So we arrive at a principle of the master/student relationship that 
I want to identify, namely submission. The apprentice is required not simply to 
undertake a rigorous training process having fully understood what is at stake ± what 
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might be understood as a calculated exchange, where the student brings the cash and 
the teacher brings the knowledge. Rather the student is asked to submit to something 
that there is no way they can really understand, an irrational commitment that is not 
incidental within this pedagogy anymore than the leap of faith could be incidental for 
Kierkegaard. In Tai Chi I had to give up the impression that my master could be fallible 
or self-seeking in order to proceed along the path. While, speaking objectively, my 
master may have been as susceptible to egoistic pretensions as anyone else, such an 
interpretation seemed to intrude upon deeper engagement. It became clear that 
interpreting the difficulties I was having with my training as a failure anywhere but 
within myself (e.g. with the master or the organization) was not going to help. Pride 
and self-interest had to be overcome but at the risk of submitting to a force that I did 
not have the capacity to fully assess. In this sense, the apprentice must make a leap of 
commitment in order to undertake the path of understanding. The student cannot know 
in advance whether the commitment they are making is worthwhile or not. There is, by 
definition, a vulnerability, risk, or wager to be made by the student. And in Chinese 
martial arts, in particular Tai Chi, as well as in other Buddhist and Taoist traditions, the 
student must engage in extensive preparatory training culminating in a ritual initiation 
WRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH\DUHZRUWK\IRUµLQVLGHWKHGRRU¶WUDLQLQJ(Docherty 1997, 61-
70). 
It is important at this stage to point out that knowledge is here not understood simply as 
a theoretical appreciation of a practice or state of affairs, but rather as lived 
understanding; that to know something is really meant to imply a unity of knowing and 
EHLQJ3HUKDSVWKHDUFKHW\SDOH[DPSOHZRXOGEHWKDWLQIHUUHGIURP3ODWR¶VRepublic, 
that in order to know justice one must attain to the virtue of justice, not simply to 
understand the principles of justice in theoretical form. One attains to justice because 
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one understands, or perceives the nature of justice and desires the good. Similarly, one 
can read that Tai Chi has certain health benefits in any number of books, but only 
through rigorous practice can one really know the benefits of Tai Chi in a direct way 
(Klein 1984; Docherty 1997; Sutton 1998). It is precisely this epistemological principle 
that plays the curious role in pedagogy that I want to highlight. For by definition, this 
real knowledge cannot be gained without engagement. But how does one know what to 
engage with prior to the illumination (or critical understanding) that follows? 
Historically this question has been easier to answer since there simply was not the range 
of traditions and teachings on offer. But the post-modern globalized age presents us 
with the kind of spiritual supermarket that makes this question especially pertinent 
(Carrette and King 2005; Karner and Aldridge 2004). How are we today to pick through 
the range of traditions and ways of life seeking our allegiance? The problem of 
allegiance relates also to the possibility of exploitation. 
A major problem with the pedagogical model that relies upon submission is the 
potential for manipulation and abuse. When it comes to the realm of spiritual pedagogy, 
within for H[DPSOH WKHµ%KDNWL¶GHYRWLRQDO WUDGLWLRQVLQ+LQGXLVPVRPHRIWKHNH\
GDQJHUVRIFRPSOHWHVXEPLVVLRQRIWKHVWXGHQWWRJXUXDUHUHIOHFWHGLQ0DU\*DUGHQ¶V
DFFRXQWRIKHUH[SHULHQFHRQWKHJXUXWUDLOGXULQJWKH¶V 
Eastern mysticism was new and exotic to Westerners, and we were in the 
vanguard as we traipsed from guru to guru, unable to see that we would have been 
better to give up on them altogether²at least until we had sorted ourselves out 
psychologically. But there had been no exposés or warnings of the damage that 
could be done to our minds and our bodies when we surrendered our critical 
thinking (and our hearts) to gurus. We were young and gullible, susceptible 
(Garden 2005).  
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Nor is this kind of problem specific to Westerners who seek the ancient wisdom of the 
µP\VWLFDOODQGV¶RIWKH2ULHQW7KH,QGLDQgurukul tradition, in which a principal guru 
or sage teaches according to their own style within an ashram, makes demands upon 
any student whether they are Western or not. These days the gurukul is generally 
confined to the ancient arts of classical music, Sanskrit, Yoga and other artistic and 
spiritual endeavors, a tradition in which, to this day students are expected to serve the 
guru and ashram in all sorts of ways, from cooking and cleaning, to collecting alms. 
Submission is a principal component of the pedagogical process in which the 
appropriate orientation of the student provides the right context for sensitive reception 
of deepHUNQRZOHGJH$V2]PRQDQG&UDYHUKDYHQRWHG³WKHJXUXPLJKWHQFRXUDJH
students to do things that seem meaningless and absurd to them but that lead to 
HQOLJKWHQPHQW7KXVVWXGHQWVPXVWEHDEOHWRSODFHJUHDWFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLUWHDFKHU´
(Ozmon 2008). The more receptive the student, the greater the opportunity to learn, but 
also the greater the risk of abuse. Scandals surrounding certain Indian gurus have 
demonstrated some of the risks associated, with notable controversies surrounding 
µ2VKR¶%KDJZDQShree Rajneesh and Sathya Sai Baba (Milne 1987; Buncombe 2011). 
My present concern is less with the potential for abuse that exists, than with the 
inevitable commitment that traditional Oriental pedagogy expects. I regard this 
commitment as a hermeneutical disposition not confined to Eastern thought, but 
something that every student, to some extent, must take towards his or her subject of 
study. Indeed, it is this disposition of commitment, what I have called a primary 
affirmation, that both creates the possibility of abuse, but also sustains the engagement 
required to enter into a productive circle of understanding. The hermeneutical circle, in 
this case, is not simply an inhibiting structure be escaped, but is equally a structure that 
facilitates and so is to be acknowledged as a space in which learning is possible.  
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But as has already been suggested, a problem of critical understanding inevitably occurs. 
On what basis can the student assess the quality or integrity of the guru? Why should a 
student enter into any specific form of commitment, when it is an irrational (perhaps 
arbitrary) decision that leads to their choice of Tai Chi, learning the piano, becoming a 
physicist, joining a monastic order, or whatever? This question is even more pertinent 
when the initial decision to enter into a commitment is made on behalf of the child by 
the parent. In the case of classical Indian music within a traditional gurukul, the student 
does not have complete access to the full depth of the artistic insight simply through 
hearing the performance of their guru. Only through extensive applied participation can 
the student fully understand and appreciate the music. From this point of view knowing 
and being are indistinguishable. To be sure, the student can appreciate some aspects 
and depths present in the music (as through a glass darkly the truth can be perceived) 
and there may be an intuitive sense that the guru is the real thing. In the arts there is a 
certain aspect through performance which can be publically shared. But what of the 
spiritual guru whose insight is that much less expressive, and is only articulated in a 
depth of presence impossible to represent. In spiritual matters, there seems to be much 
less room for maneuver within the hermeneutic circle, and so the vulnerabilities of the 
student seem that much more acute. But the problem of establishing the veracity of a 
teacher is not, of course, exclusive to Oriental traditions. 
On the whole, the Western philosophical tradition no longer accommodates the 
authoritarian style of pedagogy characteristic of the oriental world. Whether in the 
FRQWH[WRIWKH,QGLDQJXUXNXOWKH=HQ%XGGKLVWWUDLQLQJH[SORUHGLQ(XJHQ+HUULJHO¶V
book Zen in the Art of Archery (1985), or the tradition of fellowship that permeates the 
Chinese martial arts, the strong bond between teacher and student can appear rather 
peculiar or anachronistic to the uninitiated Westerner. It can appear that the student is 
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expected to submit too readily to the training regimen that is set out by the master. How 
can people be expected to put aside their critical faculty and enter into a commitment 
to some practice for which there is little rational account? But as I have argued, the 
expectation of a certain orientation or disposition is a prerequisite within the structure 
of understanding itself. The hermeneutical leap in Eastern thought could be seen simply 
as having been made explicit; the leap is formalized or ritualized. What purpose could 
this ritualization of affirmation serve? It is quite conceivable that the ritualization of 
such a process is not the anomaly. It may be that the affirmative leap is lost to Western 
pedagogy because of the relatively recent shift towards an assumption of 
epistemological neutrality and the related rejection of all forms of authoritarianism. 
Furthermore is not our tendency to ignore commitment the anomaly? Since the 
scientific revolution, we in the West have tended to regard ourselves as masters of 
nature. x  Secularisation has moved forward upon the wave of epistemological 
objectivity that regards any step of faith or unjustifiable commitment with great 
suspicion. Insofar as we regard ourselves as rational creatures, we anticipate 
eliminating any arbitrary commitments that are, in fact, an essential part of the process 
of understanding. The polarized debates around the relevance of religious studies within 
modern education in which many commentators demand objective criteria from which 
to (most often) reject the inclusion of religion, is just one example where an assumption 
of objectivity is revealed (Hand 2006; Cooling 2010). Moreover, the modern scientist 
is not at home acknowledging the kind of primary affirmation I have discussed. But 
Western philosophers and theologians have not always been as metaphysically hesitant. 
Centuries before the scientific revolution, Western thought too structured a conception 
of primary apprehension in various ways. 'HQ\V7XUQHU¶VERRNThe Darkness of God 
explores this epistemological structure and process as it occurs in varied writings, from 
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3ODWR¶VDOOHJRU\RIWKHFDYHto the writings of Christian mystics such as St. Augustine 
and John of the Cross. A clear example of this paradoxical structure is expressed in a 
recurring theme of 6W$XJXVWLQH¶VConfessions. Early on $XJXVWLQHDVNV³ZKHWKHUD
man is first to pray for help...and whether he must know you before he can call you to 
KLVDLG´$XJXVWLQHJRHVRQWRVWDWHWKHKHDUWRIWKHSUREOHP³,IKHGRHVQRWNQRZ\RX
KRZFDQKHSUD\WR\RX"´ (Augustine 1961, 1).  How can one commit to something 
without knowledge of that to which one commits? He who is lost may seek God in 
prayer, but that prayer may, in some way, be misguided or ill founded. For Augustine 
this problem is serious but not insurmountable. For God is not to be sought outside, but 
ZLWKLQ³HWHUQDOO\PRUHLQWimate to me than I am to myself´ (Turner 1995, 59). It is a 
divine seed within that draws the seeker to God. But the precise nature of this seed, 
which for Augustine is the source of all human longing, is not something that can be 
thematically defined or determined. As the source of human desire, God is both 
knowable and beyond knowledge. The dialectic of desire in Augustine draws upon a 
rich Neo-Platonic heritage in which the Good (or the One) remains, in some sense, at 
the apex of human understanding and activity. The condition of human desire is 
structured by the force of radiation of the Good, and it is our ability to respond to this 
force that, for Augustine, demonstrates the presence of divinity in humanity. Ultimately, 
education cannot be dissociated from the process of coming to know God within. This 
example from Augustinian thought illustrates the Neo-Platonic epistemology that 
animates the Latin Christian tradition and has therefore been massively influential in 
the West. One can trace indications of an understanding of primary affirmation from 
Plato, through Plotinus and Proclus, Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Eckhart and 
even up to Descartes (Lewin 2011, 62-63). But a fuller study of this strand is beyond 
my present scope. 
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As we saw earlier, from the Oriental perspective, the master-student relation is a 
complex and necessary one, said to encourage a detachment from the ego by way of 
surrender. The path of surrender to a master might seem a long way from modern 
western schools, colleges and universities where often it is increasingly thought to be 
the job of the educator to adapt and commit to the needs of the student, not the other 
way around. In these days of rising university fees, the consumer model is no longer 
simply a theoretical concern for the academy (Bok 2003; Palfreyman 2004). We have 
moved a long way away from the tradition that once took for granted the providential 
nature of the world as the basis of education. For the pre-modern mind, education would 
begin with the affirmation of divine order and providence a point to which I will return 
shortly. 
There is a danger that the temporal distance of the Western theological tradition, and 
the cultural distance of Eastern thought and practice will render these observations 
irrelevant to the business of contemporary pedagogy. Indeed, anyone working within 
state education in the UK WRGD\ FDQ VFDUFHO\ EH XQDZDUH RI WKH µVWXGHQW-FHQWUHG¶
paradigm that currently prevails (Estes 2004). This orientation towards the needs, 
concerns and proclivities of the student no doubt has much to commend it: it appears 
to ensure a certain commitment to standards by teachers; it encourages an appropriate 
synthesis between engagement, entertainment and education, driven by the idea that 
students learn most effectively when they are engaged; and it is built upon a model of 
cooperation over coercion which in principle accords with modern sensibilities. This is 
some way from Indian gurukul tradition that would require months, even years of 
apparently menial application by the student to demonstrate their commitment thereby 
ensuring that their interests in education are unsullied by utilitarian or individualistic 
interests. It is the starkness of the contrast between Eastern and Western pedagogy, 
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even with the rough caricatures offered here that can prove instructive, because we are 
then able to glimpse some of our deeper assumptions about the freedom and 
individualism of our present context, to which I now turn. 
Individualism 
Philosophically speaking it would seem that the individualism of the West is central to 
this difference. Freedom is at the heart of our culture, individual creative expression the 
oil of the Western machine. That conception of individuality finds its historical roots in 
the slow dissolution of the Christian cosmos that took place following the cultural shift 
inaugurated by such figures as Galileo, Bacon and Newton. Thomas Hobbes provided 
the narrative of political liberalism that was built around the priority of the individual, 
in which social organization exists only above a prepolitical and lawless state of natural 
isolation (Hobbes 1975; Dupre 1995, 129). At the same time, Descartes (1988) was 
defining the apex of individualism as the capacity to think and thereby to be sure of 
self-existence at the inevitable expense of any secure knowledge of the world and other 
people. Whatever Descartes¶ intentions, the Cartesian legacy was a self-certain subject 
severed from passive objects that populate a dead cosmos. Prior to this, the Greek-
Christian synthesis understood that a kind of divine intelligence inheres within the 
cosmos itself and is not solely resident within the minds of human beings.  
While speaking to a specific political context, Paulo Freire has described the dire 
consequences, if not the causes, in his metaphor of the banking concept of education in 
which students are filled with the objects of knowledge (2000, chapter 2). No longer is 
education a process of seeking coherence between the human mind and a world 
suffused with divine intelligibility, as it was for Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas 1952; 
Milbank and Pickstock 2001), rather education is the about filling of the student with 
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representational knowledge of world without intrinsic meaning. The consequent 
secularism is then unsurprising. The deeper relevance here is the sense that an 
intelligent cosmos calls for a primary affirmation since there is an intrinsic order to 
things from which understanding the world may begin. In the language of philosophical 
hermeneutics, the order of things is always already understood prior to any movement 
of learning. Seeing providence in the structure of things always entails a commitment 
of the mind which, from a skeptical perspective, might seem unjustified, but as noted 
earlier, is in fact an inescapable presupposition of knowing at all, even in the most 
secular of scientific approaches. The philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1975) 
sought to explain this presupposition by way of his rehabilitation of prejudice, authority 
and tradition. As Jeff Malpas puts it, ³The prejudicial character of understanding means 
that, whenever we understand, we are involved in a dialogue that encompasses both our 
own self-understanding and our understanding of the matter at issue... One consequence 
of Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice is a positive evaluation of the role of authority 
and tradition as legitimate sources of knowledge´ (2009). Gadamer saw himself as 
providing a necessary corrective to the obsession with objectivity characteristic of 
(QOLJKWHQPHQWWKRXJKW&OHDUO\*DGDPHU¶VFRQFHUQWRfind a positive role for tradition, 
authority and even prejudice corresponds with my concern to articulate the step of 
affirmation within education. Along with Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur provide a 
rich philosophical context for an appreciation of the contextual nature of learning. 
Application 
This inquiry has offered indications of the structure of learning which itself is rooted in 
a deeper epistemology. I have suggested that the philosophical hermeneutics of 
Gadamer and Ricoeur provide a theoretical basis for understanding what I call the leap 
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of learning. Beyond purely philosophical reflection, are there any practical implications 
of this analysis? 
In calling for some acknowledgement of the leap of learning, I am not arguing for a 
paradigm shift in educational theory from individual freedom to a more submissive 
attitude; still less am I recommending total submission to the authority of a great teacher. 
But submission is a spectrum, attitude or orientation, rather than a clear-cut state or 
decision. I argue that an essential component of education is the spontaneous 
orientation of engagement in which attention is given. My claim ultimately is that a 
form of submission is essential to every form of understanding whether in the Indian 
traditional gurukul, the Tai Chi class in London, or the sometimes mundane context of 
school education up and down the country. The simplest form of everyday submission 
is the act of listening and paying attention. In other words, attention is submission.  
An interesting way to consider the relevance of this for educators today is to find ways 
of acknowledging affirmation, and one way to do this would be through a consideration 
of the gift of attention. The moment the student gives the teacher attention they offer a 
wager, albeit in a small way. Students could be encouraged to see that the gift of 
attention to a subject of study is just that, a gift. I do not believe that a recognition of 
the gift character of attention would result in a miserly attitude in which the students 
measure out their attention, as though conscious of the precious commodity in their 
purview and wanting to preserve it for things they already know to be pleasing. Students 
would be better prepared to offer their attention if teachers did more to recognize and 
appreciate the gift of the student¶s attention. This simple recognition, even if it is not 
ritualized in forms akin to the Eastern traditions we have touched upon, would assist 
students in recognizing their responsibility. Yet the onus is on the educator to 
acknowledge the gift of attention, of affirmation, that begins the journey of education. 
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The structures of modern educational policy, from the use of aims and objectives in 
classes, to the transparency of the curriculum, can sometimes give the impression that 
educators must give a guarantee of success and engagement in advance of the process 
(see Dunne 1993). These performative structures may remove some of the risks 
associated with the leap of learning, but the wager is an essential component of the 
process itself. The leap would not be the same if a harness supported us. But most 
seriously, there is a danger that performative structures contribute to a general 
concealment of this leap and its necessity. 
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that a moment of pure attention, whether 
listening to music, eating food, or being with friends, is a form of giving up the self, of 
submission. The strange and the unfamiliar, in a word the other, are themselves 
opportunities for giving of oneself, for what the philosopher of education Krishnamurti 
(1969) called µfreedom from the known¶. While we spend much of our lives engaged 
ZLWK WKH µNQRZQ¶ WKHPRYHPHQW of learning described by Krishnamurti is precisely 
understood as a freedom from the tired representations that constitute our daily 
experience of the world. For him it is only the quality of attention that makes real 
education possible. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that an understanding of the affirmation implicit in education, and in 
epistemology generally, allows us to dissolve the idol of objectivity that still haunts our 
conception of the modern curriculum. I have suggested that Eastern forms of traditional 
pedagogy present alternatives to the Western individualistic conception of liberal 
education. ,QWKHSUHVHQWFOLPDWHZKHUHWKHQRWLRQRIDµQHXWUDO¶UHODWLRQVKLSWROHDUQLQJ
underpins the broadly secular language of school curriculum development in the UK, 
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the idea of submission could seem radical, scandalous, or absurd. My intention has been 
to demonstrate the implicit forms of submission that constitute the daily activities of 
educators and of students, whether or not they regard their activities in neutral terms. 
My view rests on the assumption that there is no neutral ground in education from which 
to teach the facts, an assumption that might also seem questionable among certain 
circles. But I have tried at least to demonstrate the many contexts in which these 
assumptions would not seem problematic. Indeed I referred to Augustinian thought to 
suggest a pre-modern form of this structure of pedagogy. I have presented these 
µDOWHUQDWLYHSHGDJRJLHV¶LQRUGHUWRHYRNHWKHWUDFH of commitment or the leap involved 
in undertaking any learning at all. Recognizing this commitment encourages us to value 
our rootedness in tradition while simultaneously calling for a critical engagement with 
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i Although Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur are most associated with 
philosophical hermeneutics, Nietzsche specialists might seek to explain the hermeneutical approach set 
out here in terms of a Nietzschean philosophy of affirmation. Although I suspect such a connection 
may be fruitful, it lies beyond my present concerns. 
ii This modern sense of hermeneutics develops largely in the wake of the philosophy of Martin 
+HLGHJJHU$V.DUO6LPPVKDVSRLQWHGRXW+DQV*HRUJ*DGDPHU¶VERRNTruth and Method 
³UHSUHVHQWVWKHILUVWDWWHPSWWRGHYHORSDIXOO\IOHGJHGµKHUPHQHXWLFV¶LQWKHPRGHUQVHQVH´6LPPV
2003, 39). But RiFRHXU¶VPRUHVXVWDLQHGWUHDWPHQWRIKHUPHQHXWLFVLVDUJXDEO\DWOHDVWDVLQIOXHQWLDO
today. 
iii Along with Alasdair MacIntyre, Ricoeur elaborated the religious significance of atheism by 
examining the theological signifLFDQFHRIWKHµJUHDW¶DWKHLVWV Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche (MacIntyre 
and Ricoeur 1969). This kind of atheism is some way from the resurgent atheism espoused by certain 
secularists and humanists skeptiFDORIDSSDUHQWµSRVW-VHFXODU¶FRQWHPSRUDU\FRQWH[WV 
iv +HLGHJJHU¶VDFFRXQWRIµLQYROYHG¶UHODtions with things is most consistently elaborated within Being 
and Time (Heidegger 1996). 
v For St Anselm, who is most associated with the Christian dictum faith seeking understanding (fides 
quaerens intellectum), faith is understood more as an act of orientation or volition. In line with the 
thesis of a primary affirmation, Anselm understands this formula to indicate: "an active love of God 
seeking a deeper knowledge of God" (Anselm 2001). 
vi Ricoeur adopts the notion of the wager, made most famous by Blaise Pascal, to explore the nature of 
HQJDJHGKHUPHQHXWLFV7KHZDJHULV³WKDW,VKDOOKDYHDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPDQDQGRIWKHERQG
between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic thought. 
That wager then becomes the task of verifying my wager and saturating it, so to speak, with 
intelligibility. In return, the task transforms my wager: in betting on the significance of the symbolic 
world, I bet at the same time that my wager will be restored to me in power of reflection, in coherent 
GLVFRXUVH´5LFRHXU 
vii 5LFRHXUFDOOVWKLVDµORQJ-URXWH¶WREHLQJYLDLQWHUSUHWLYHVWUXFWXUHVLQFRQWUDVWWR+HLGHJJHU¶VPRUH
direct route to fundamental ontology (see Kearney 2004, 22). 
viii By contrast to the following account of my own experience, here are words that might otherwise 
characterize the depth of relation in more substantial terms: ³0HHWLQJRQH¶V*XUXRU0DVWHULVD
Mystery. It is a date with destiny. Those who are lucky enough to stumble upon this seismic encounter 
may never be the same again. In that meeting one experiences, suddenly or gradually, an ecstatic 
UHOHDVHLQWRWKHOLPLWOHVVVLQJXODULW\DQGGHSWKRIRQH¶V7UXH6HOI´%DPSWRQ 
ix Among the best known examples of this formulation of self-understanding is to be found in Luke 
³ZKRHYHUZDQWVWRVDYHKLVOLIHZLOOORVHLWEXWZKRHYHUORVHVKLVOLIHIRUPHZLOOVDYHLW´ 
x 7KHLQIDPRXVLPDJHRI)UDQFLV%DFRQDGYRFDWLQJWKHµWRUWXUHRIQDWXUH¶PD\QRWEHKLVWRULFDOO\
accurate (Pesic 1999), but the general notion that we have expected nature to yield knowledge is not an 
unfair characterization of modern scientific and technological practice. 
                                                        
